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The highest Dutch courts and the preliminary
ruling procedure: Critically obedient interlocutors
of the Court of Justice
Jasper Krommendijk*
Abstract
Little is known about the motives of national courts to request a preliminary ruling from the Court
of Justice of the EU (CJEU) or their satisfaction with and implementation of answers. This article
aims to fill this empirical gap on the basis of an analysis of judgments complemented with inter-
views with judges of the highest courts in the Netherlands. This article shows that judges exten-
sively use the procedure and follow its outcome almost without exception, despite some
dissatisfaction. This discontent has surprisingly not affected the courts' willingness to refer in
future. The findings also downplay the bureaucratic politics and judicial empowerment theses
emphasising strategic motives to refer. Instead, legal‐formalist considerations and the desire to
contribute to the development of EU law explain most of the references of the Dutch Supreme
Court. The decision (not) to refer of the three highest administrative courts is primarily based on
practical and pragmatic considerations.
1 | INTRODUCTION
There has beenmuch (quantitative) research that tries to explain why courts in someMember States request more pre-
liminary rulings from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) than courts in otherMember States. The aim of
such studies is to identify aggregate‐level factors, such as the level of gross domestic product (GDP), population size or
the majoritarian/constitutional tradition.1 Yet, still little is known about the motives of individual judges to refer (or not)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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and the considerations that play a role in the decision‐making in concrete cases.2 The same is true about the satisfac-
tion of judges with the requested answers from Luxembourg.3 There are some older studies suggesting a high imple-
mentation rate of CJEU judgments,4 while recent contributions indicate a growing opposition of some courts to
comply with CJEU judgments.5 Satisfaction and implementation are, however, not necessarily the same, because even
dissatisfied judges may implement CJEU judgments. Merely looking at implementation rates might not give the whole
picture of the functioning of the preliminary ruling procedure and could also conceal discontent with CJEU judgments.
This article delves into the mindset of national court judges and researches, firstly, their willingness to implement
CJEU judgments. It will, secondly, examine the judges' satisfaction with the requested CJEU judgments and, thirdly,
their motives to refer. This article focuses on the references of the four highest Dutch courts in the period 2013–
2016 (see Section 2 for an overview). The Netherlands is arguably one of the most compliant EU Member States, with
courts being generally ‘integration friendly’.6 This general wisdom is, however, not entirely true. A Dutch judge, for
example, referred to the preliminary reference procedure as ‘a one‐way Q&A procedure that lacks timely exchange
of new relevant information’.7 At the same time, there is also criticism in Dutch academic literature as to the sometimes
activist and far‐reaching case law of the CJEU, especially in certain areas such as tax law or intellectual property.8 Dur-
ing a conference in November 2015 attended byDutch judges, legal assistants and other practitioners in the field of tax
law, 65% of the attendees agreed with the proposition that the CJEU does not make a major contribution to solving
European tax problems.9 In addition, there are also indications that Cilfit is applied loosely by some of the highest courts
in the Netherlands.10 The Council of State recently decided a point of EU law itself without a reference because of the
delay and consequences for other cases that a reference would entail, despite recognising that the matter did not con-
stitute an acte clair.11 The latter was also explicitly mentioned by the Supreme Court as a reason for not referring.12
This article will address the three research questions based on legal‐empirical research combining legal doctrinal
analysis and interviews. All decisions of the highest courts to refer and not to refer in the time period 2013–2016
were analysed to address the third question on the motives to refer.13 To answer the first and second question on
2For earlier empirical studies, see M. Wind, ‘The Nordics, the EU and the Reluctance towards Supranational Judicial Review’ (2010) 48 Journal of Common
Market Studies, 1039; U. Jaremba, ‘Polish Civil Judiciary vis‐à‐vis the Preliminary Ruling Procedure: In Search of a Mid‐Range Theory’, in B. de Witte et al.
(eds.), National Courts and EU law: New Issues, Theories and Methods (Edward Elgar, 2016) 49; T. Pavone, ‘Revisiting Judicial Empowerment in the European
Union: Limits of Empowerment, Logics of Resistance’ (2018) 6 Journal of Law and Courts, 303.
3M. Bobek, ‘Of Feasibility and Silent Elephants: The Legitimacy of the Court of Justice through the Eyes of National Courts’, in M. Adams et al. (eds.), Judging
Europe's Judges: The Legitimacy of the European Court of Justice Examined (Hart, 2013), 197, 197.
4An implementation rate of 90% was found for the Netherlands in the period 1961–1985. Nyikos likewise found an ‘extremely high’ rate of 96%. J. Korte
(ed.), ‘Primus Inter Pares: The European Court and National Courts. The Follow‐up by National Courts of Preliminary Rulings ex Art. 177 of the Treaty of
Rome: A Report on the Situation in the Netherlands’ (1990) EUI Law Working Paper; S.A. Nyikos, ‘The Preliminary Reference Process. National Court Imple-
mentation, Changing Opportunity Structures and Litigant Desistment’ (2003) 4 European Union Politics, 397, 410.
5See, e.g., the way in which the Danish Supreme Court was unwilling to change its ruling after Ajos. Case C‐441/14, Dansk Industri, ECLI:EU:C:2016:278;
See also A. Torres Pérez, ‘Melloni in Three Acts: From Dialogue to Monologue’ (2014) 10 European Constitutional Law Review, 308; T. de la Mare and C.
Donnelly, ‘Preliminary Rulings and EU Legal Integration: Evolution and Stasis’, in P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford University
Press, 2011) 363, 390–391.
6Bobek, above, n. 3, 213.
7M. de Werd, ‘Dynamics at Play in the EU Preliminary Ruling Procedure’ (2015), 22 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 149, 152.
8E.g. H. Vording, ‘EU‐verdragsvrijheden: minder Nederlands activisme gewenst’ [EU‐freedoms: the need for less Dutch activism], in J.P. Boer (ed.), Kwaliteit
van belastingrechtspraak belicht. Liber amicorum aangeboden aan prof. dr. A.O. Lubbers (Sdu, 2013), 209; P. Oliver and C. Stothers, ‘Intellectual Property under
the Charter: Are the Court's Scales Properly Calibrated’ (2017) 54 Common Market Law Review, 517–566.
9‘De machine doet het monnikenwerk, wij het denkwerk’, 11 December 2015, https://ssr.nl/2015/de‐machine‐doet‐het‐monnikenwerk‐wij‐het‐denkwerk/
10H. Sevenster and C. Wissels, ‘Laveren tussen Ferreira en Van Dijk’ [Plying between Ferreira en Van Dijk], in M. Bosma et al. (eds.), Graag nog even bespreken.
Liber amicorum Henk Lubberdink (Raad van State, 2016), 83, 83.
11ABRvS, 13 April 2016, NL:RVS:2016:890–891, para. 5.2.
12The Supreme Court held that a reference would impede considerably effective and speedy criminal justice because the settlement of criminal cases in
which a similar question is at stake will be delayed for an unacceptably long period. HR 22 December 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:3608, para. 6.3.
13Searched on www.rechtspraak.nl for ‘prejudiciële vragen’ [preliminary questions] and ‘267 VWEU’ [267 TFEU] for the period 1 January 2013 until 31
December 2016. For an extensive description of the research design and methodology, see J. Krommendijk, ‘The Preliminary Reference Dance between
the CJEU and Dutch Courts in the Field of Migration’ (2018) 10 European Journal of Legal Studies, 101.
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follow‐up and satisfaction, the national court's follow‐up judgment was compared with the requested CJEU ruling.
For this analysis use was also made of secondary literature and commentaries discussing the reasoning of the CJEU
and/or follow‐up by the referring court. Interviews played an important complementary role, because it is often dif-
ficult to distill particular reasons for referral or the ‘true’ appraisal of the CJEU answers from national court judg-
ments.14 Sixteen interviews were conducted with Dutch judges and legal secretaries of the three highest
administrative courts.15 Fifteen interviews were held with judges and Advocates‐General (A‐Gs) in the Supreme
Court; seven in the civil chamber and seven in the tax chamber, while one interviewee served in both chambers.16
In order to protect the anonymity of interviewees, their names and identities are not disclosed.17 The reliance on
interviews obviously has limitations. The reasons provided by interviewees are often ex post rationalisations or inter-
viewees might be tempted to (un)consciously downplay particular reasons, because they are not in line with their
self‐image and professional attitude as a judge. In order to alleviate this problem, the interview data were
complemented with the analysis of case law, extra‐judicial writing of judges and secondary literature to triangulate
the data as far as possible.18
This article aims to fill an empirical gap in the literature. In addition to this academic relevance, this research also is
practically relevant as well since it aims to assess whether allegations that the referral procedure is not working opti-
mally and there is growing opposition to CJEU judgments are true. This article will contribute to the literature in the
following ways and as such has a relevance going beyond the Netherlands.19 Firstly, whereas the findings of this
study cannot be transferred to other European jurisdictions, they show that we cannot merely base our understand-
ing of the interaction between the CJEU and national courts on the actual judgments. Instead, we need to get ‘into
the heads and minds’ of the key actors. In doing so, secondly, this article shows that that there are not only differ-
ences between EU Member States with respect to the use of the preliminary ruling procedure, but also within
Member States between different courts and even within these courts between judges.20 Thirdly, this article focuses
on courts that have so far not received much in‐depth attention, since the literature has primarily focused on consti-
tutional courts and their interaction with the CJEU.21 Fourthly, the findings complement a large part of the research
to date, primarily of social science studies relying exclusively on quantitative research.22 In doing so, this study dem-
onstrates the nuance and the complexity that is often hidden in large‐scale statistical research. There is a wide variety
in the reasons for national courts to refer or not. The findings thus downplay dominant theoretical explanations,
including the bureaucratic politics and judicial empowerment theses that mainly emphasise political strategic consid-
erations of judges. This research shows that legal as well as practical and pragmatic reasons are equally, or possibly
even more important (Section 5). Fifthly, this article shows that the high implementation rate of CJEU judgments by
the referring courts conceals some dissatisfaction with those judgments (Section 3). Even in the Netherlands, where
courts have traditionally been compliant interlocutors, there is quite some criticism as to the functioning of the
procedure and the CJEU judgments as this introduction has also indicated (Section 4).
14Besides a legal enumeration of the reasons why there is doubt as to the interpretation of EU law, the highest Dutch courts hardly include an explicit reflec-
tion on considerations that played a role in their decisions.
15Two interviews at the ABRvS were held in September 2015, while the other 14 took place between December 2016 and August 2017. ABRvS (6), CRvB
(5) and CBb (5).
16Two interviews took pace in September 2016, while the other 13 were held between June and August 2018.
17A number between 0 and 100 was randomly selected for the interviews. Note that no references are made in relation to specific cases to avoid indirect
identification of the interviewees.
18For more strategies, see Krommendijk, above, n. 13, 119–120.
19The author and his colleague Jesse Claassen will conduct similar studies on states with a different practice of referral in the context of the earlier men-
tioned research project. This includes the following EU Member States: Ireland, United Kingdom, Germany and Austria.
20See, earlier, R.D. Kelemen and T. Pavone, ‘The Political Geography of European Legal Integration’ (2018) 70 World Politics, 358.
21E.g. special issue ‘The Preliminary Reference to the Court of Justice of The European Union by Constitutional Courts’ (2015) 16 German Law Journal.
22I would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for raising this point.
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2 | THE HIGHEST DUTCH COURTS AND THE OBLIGATION TO REFER
UNDER ART. 267 TFEU
Before delving into the findings of this research, it is important to sketch the legal context as well as a short back-
ground of the work of the four highest Dutch courts. Article 267 TFEU obliges courts or tribunals to refer to the
CJEU when a question is raised about the interpretation or validity of EU law in a case in which ‘there is no judicial
remedy under national law’, provided that ‘a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment’.
There are two exceptions to this obligation for the highest courts, which are commonly referred to as the Cilfit excep-
tions. The highest courts are not obliged to refer when the CJEU has ‘already dealt with the point of law in question’
(acte éclairé) or when ‘the correct application of [EU] law may be so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable
doubt’ (acte clair).23 The CJEU did not make it easy for national courts to find an acte clair, because courts ‘must be
convinced that the matter is equally obvious to the courts of the other Member States and to the Court of Justice’.24
Before reaching that conclusion, they have to consider the characteristic features of EU law and compare, amongst
others, different language versions of the provision(s) of EU law.25 As will be discussed further below, there is much
discussion in the literature as to the viability of the Cilfit test.26 This is because the requirements for an acte clair seem
more difficult to fulfil now than at the time Cilfit was rendered in 1982, because there are 28 (instead of 10) different
legal systems and 24 (instead of 7) official working languages. In addition, nowadays EU law extends over much more
legal fields. A‐GWahl formulated this problem in a lucid way: ‘If one were to adhere to a rigid reading of the case‐law,
coming across a ‘true’ acte clair situation would, at best, seem just as likely as encountering a unicorn.’27
The CJEU seemed to relax the Cilfit exceptions for the highest national courts in Van Dijk, because it held that the
fact that other (national) courts ruled differently or did refer a question does not detract from the highest court's con-
clusion that the matter is clair.28 Nonetheless, the CJEU decided on the same day in Ferreira da Silva that the
Portuguese Supreme Court could not have determined an acte clair because of conflicting decisions of lower
Portuguese courts and the fact that that matter frequently gave rise to difficulties of interpretation in various
Member States.29 The CJEU suggested that the Portuguese court's failure to request a preliminary ruling could
constitute a breach of article 267 TFEU, (potentially) giving rise to Köbler state liability, leaving that matter for the
referring court to consider. It was in Köbler that the CJEU determined that the principle of state liability also applies
in case of infringements of EU law that stem from a decision of a national court of last instance.30 Recent CJEU
judgments underscore that the CJEU sticks to the strict Cilfit test.31 Especially noteworthy is the CJEU decision in
Commission/France, where it found for the first time a breach of Art. 267 TFEU for the failure of the French Conseil
d'État to refer.32
Four Dutch courts are obliged to refer based on Art. 267 TFEU. The Supreme Court (HR) as well as the three
highest administrative courts: the Administrative Division of the Council of State (ABRvS), the Central Appeals Tribu-
nal (CRvB), the Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal (CBb). All four courts are repeat players in the preliminary ruling
procedure. In the past decades, roughly two‐thirds of all Dutch questions came from those courts. The Trade and
23Case 283/81, Cilfit, ECLI:EU:C:1982:335, paras. 14 and 16.
24Ibid., para. 16.
25Ibid., paras. 17–20.
26M. Broberg and N. Fenger, Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice (Oxford University Press, 2014), 255; T. Tridimas, ‘Knocking on Heaven's
Door: Fragmentation, Efficiency and Defiance in the Preliminary Reference Procedure’ (2003) 40 Common Market Law Review, 9, 42–44.
27A‐G Wahl in Joined cases C‐72/14 and C‐197/14, X. & Van Dijk, ECLI:EU:C:2015:319, para. 62.
28C‐72/14 and C‐197/14, X. & Van Dijk, ECLI:EU:C:2015:564.
29C‐160/14, Ferreira da Silva, ECLI: EU:C:2015:565, paras. 40–42.
30C‐224/01, Köbler, ECLI:EU:C:2003:513. See also C‐173/03, Traghetti del Mediterraneo, ECLI:EU:C:2006:391; C‐379/10, Commission/Italy, ECLI:EU:
C:2011:775.
31C‐379/15, Association France Nature Environnement, ECLI:EU:C:2016:603, paras. 48–50.
32C‐416/17, Commission/France, ECLI:EU:C:2018:811, para. 111.
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Industry Appeals Tribunal has traditionally been a natural interlocutor of the CJEU, because it deals with economic
public law and more than 80% of the legislation over which it has jurisdiction has European roots.33 The other
two highest administrative courts have also become prominent players at the EU level in recent years because of
the Europeanisation of the fields of law over which they have jurisdiction, including for instance migration (Council
of State) or social security (Central Appeals Tribunal).34 The tax chamber of the Supreme Court is (one of) the biggest
European players in the Netherlands with 36 references in the four year period 2013–2016, but also in comparison
with other European tax judges (see Table 1).35 The civil chamber is also increasingly confronted with EU law, espe-
cially in the fields of intellectual property (IP), consumer law, competition law and international private law. The crim-
inal chamber is left out of this comparison, and will be dealt with separately at a later instance.36 As will be further
outlined below, the highest administrative courts are second‐line courts of fact while the Supreme Court is the third
instance cassation court that only examines questions of law. The Supreme Court also functions differently than, for
example, the UK Supreme Court, which grants permission to appeal only when a case involves ‘an arguable point of
law of general public importance’.37
3 | THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF CJEU JUDGMENTS
Nearly all requested answers of the CJEU are neatly followed by the referring court in the respective case submitted to
theCJEU.During the analysis of the national court's follow‐up judgment in the light of the requestedCJEU judgment, no
casewas found inwhich a Dutch highest court clearly departed from the CJEU. During interviews, therewere no judges
that doubted the necessity of strictly complying with CJEU judgments.38 Supreme Court judges held that CJEU judg-
ments simply constitute law and cannot be disputed.39 The Supreme Court and the other highest courts have never
‘dared’ to mention that the CJEU has beenwrong or to choose a different direction than the CJEU.40 The highest courts
also had no problemwith changing their own case law as a result of CJEU judgments. Interviewees referred to this as a
‘fait accompli’ and held that this is simply ‘part of the game’.41 Judges even had no ‘hard feelings’when the CJEUdecided
33R. Winter in R. Koelewijn, ‘Brussels recht en de Hollandse praktijk’, NRC Handelsblad, 29 June 2004; Interviews 31, 69, 77.
34Interview 86.
35Only German tax courts asked more questions than Dutch courts between 2003 and 2013.Vording, above, n. 8, 209.
36The criminal chamber only submitted its first reference in 2016 on the Return Directive. Case C‐225/16, Ouhrami, ECLI:EU:C:2017:590. The Supreme
Court asked a (second) follow‐up question in HR 27 November 2018, ECLI:NL:HR:2018:2192. See above, n. 12, for the reason why the Supreme Court
is generally reluctant to refer in the field of criminal law. In addition, the limited number of references also stem from the fact that the impact of EU law
on criminal law is minimal, even though that is changing in recent years with secondary law laying down a harmonized set of procedural rights of suspects.
V. Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law After Lisbon: Rights, Trust and the Transformation of Justice in Europe (Hart, 2016), 154–184.
37https://www.supremecourt.uk/about/role‐of‐the‐supreme‐court.html. On this difference between the UK and the Netherlands, see M. Feteris, ‘Develop-
ment of the Law by Supreme Courts in Europe’ (2017) 13 Utrecht Law Review, 155, 157.
38Interviews 15, 27, 34, 41.
39Interviews 78; 15, 30, 41.
40Interviews 27.
41Interviews 5, 15, 18, 34, 72, 77, 82, 89, 91; Sevenster and Wissels, above, n. 10, 93.
TABLE 1 Number of references of the Dutch highest courts (2013–2016)
Number of references
Council of State (ABRvS) 22
Central appeals tribunal (CRvB) 13
Trade and industry appeals tribunal (CBb) 10
Tax chamber SC (HR) 36
Civil chamber SC (HR) 12
Criminal chamber SC (HR) 1
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differently than the preferred answer of the referring court as in in Kieback: ‘that is just the way it is’.42 One interviewee
mentioned in relation to the inconsistencies in the Schumacker line of cases: ‘This happens.We simply execute it’.43 Both
Kieback and Schumacker deal with the taxing of non‐residents. Tax law judges were critical about the Schumacker line of
cases and held that Kieback does not fit easily into these earlier cases (see Section 4.1).44
The conclusion that CJEU judgments are loyally implemented, however, obscures the fact that national court
judges are not always satisfied with all judgments, as will be made clear in the next section. This has, however, not
prevented courts from questioning the need to comply with the CJEU. This loyalty is exemplified by the follow‐up
judgment in Diageo Brands about the execution of a Bulgarian judgment (allegedly) in breach of EU law. Despite enor-
mous frustration, which will be spelled out below, the Supreme Court held that it could not examine the correctness
of CJEU judgments and replace them with its own judgment (see Section 4.2).45 The Central Appeals Tribunal even
‘defended’ the CJEU in Franzen, in which the CJEU wrongly interpreted the Dutch law (see Section 4.3).46
4 | JUDGES' DISSATISFACTION WITH SOME CJEU JUDGMENTS
Even though judges were generally satisfied with the CJEU and its judgments (Section 4.1), almost all judges and,
especially highest administrative court judges and judges of the civil chamber, showed some discontent with partic-
ular judgments. They lamented that the CJEU did not answer the question asked or did so in an unclear way (Section
4.2), or the CJEU interpreted the national law and the facts of the case wrongly (Section 4.3).
4.1 | Cautious satisfaction with the CJEU and its judgments in general
Almost all highest court judges expressed their satisfaction with most, but certainly not all, of the answers of the
CJEU. They noted in general that CJEU judgments are useful and clear.47 The highest administrative court judges,
especially those of the Council of State and Central Appeals Tribunal, were more reluctant and noted that the quality
of CJEU judgments varies.48 They were also more critical of the interaction with the CJEU and referred to the
absence of a genuine dialogue.49 One judge held that approximately 80% of the requested CJEU rulings were
answered in a satisfactory way, while another noted that three out of ten cases were less satisfactory.50 Supreme
Court judges, especially those from the tax chamber, were less critical of CJEU judgments. Some interviewees from
the Supreme Court only admitted, after repeating the question, that there are some problematic CJEU judgments,
while others insisted that there are no deficient judgments at all.51 Tax judges even warned against criticism and held
that it is easy to disqualify CJEU judgments as ‘oracle speech’ and stated that it does not suit Supreme Court judges
to talk ‘sharply and unpleasantly’ about CJEU judgments.52 Civil judges of the Supreme Court were, however, slightly
more forthcoming in enumerating some deficient CJEU judgments as discussed below. The less critical attitude of
Supreme Court judges is surprising in the light of the fact that Supreme Court judges noted that the CJEU is full
of (economical) administrative law judges and that the CJEU has less expertise in the area of tax and civil law, as also
42Case C‐9/14, Kieback, ECLI:EU:C:2015:406; Interviews 33, 82.
43Case C‐279/93, Schumacker, ECLI:EU:C:1995:31; Interview 78.
44Interviews 30, 78.
45Case C‐681/13, Diageo Brands, ECLI:EU:C:2015:471; HR 8 July 2016, ECLI:NL:HR:2016:1431(Diageo Brands), para. 4.2.1.
46Case C‐382/13, Franzen, ECLI:EU:C:2015:261; CRvB 6 June 2016, ECLI:NL:CRVB:2016:2144 (Franzen), para. 4.13.
47Interviews 10, 12, 15, 18, 24, 27, 30, 33, 34, 41, 44, 45, 66, 72, 77, 78, 82, 87, 91.
48Interviews 18, 24, 89.
49Interviews 10, 24, 44, 66, 81, 89, 91.
50Interviews 91, 10.
51One Supreme Court judge (41) noted that the editing of judgments seems to be valued less at the CJEU than the Supreme Court.
52Interview 15.
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noted by interviewees.53 One explanation for the difference between the highest administrative courts and the tax
chamber mentioned by a Supreme Court judge is that highest administrative court judges have more ideas about
the outcome of a case and the desired interpretation than Supreme Court judges, also because they generally ‘think’
more in political terms. With such an attitude, it is more confronting when the CJEU chooses a different direction.
This could result in more dissatisfaction.54
Most judges, but especially those of the Supreme Court, were able to put their criticism in context. They, firstly,
noted that criticism is normal and is something they are familiar with themselves.55 Secondly, interviewees voiced
their understanding for the difficult context in which the CJEU operates, with 28 different legal orders and 23 official
languages as well as many different legal fields and specialisations.56 One Supreme Court judge even expressed his
‘admiration’ for the CJEU, because his/her experience as a judge in the Benelux Court with three neighbouring coun-
tries and two languages showed how difficult the task of an international court is.57 Within the highest administrative
courts, there were more differences between judges. EU law‐oriented judges had more understanding for the CJEU
than national law‐oriented career judges.58 Some interviewees, especially those of the Supreme Court, also put part
of the blame on themselves and argued that the quality of CJEU judgments depends on the order for reference of the
referring court and the quality of the reasoning and analysis.59 As will be argued below as well, deficient CJEU judg-
ments could result from poor information provision by the referring court.
The interviews also revealed another difference between the Supreme Court and highest administrative courts. The
highest administrative court judges primarily assessedCJEU judgments in terms of their ability to solve the case at hand.
They did not examine them from a more analytical perspective focused on whether the CJEU answered all questions
satisfactorily and in line with its earlier jurisprudence.60 Several interviewees of the Supreme Court, however, also
adopted the latter perspective and primarily voiced concerns about the consistency of CJEU jurisprudence.61One inter-
viewee, for example, held that the CJEUpays insufficient attention to the position of the judgmentwithin the ‘edifice’ of
its case law, something that the SupremeCourt is verymuch concernedwith also because of its responsibility for judicial
law making.62 Civil law judges voiced their criticism about intellectual property cases about the ‘communication to the
public’ (‘there's neither rhyme nor reason to it’, according to one interviewee)63 as well as ‘the essential function of a
trade mark’.64 Tax law judges criticised the case law in relation to direct taxes for natural and legal persons (Schumacker
and Daily Mail).65 Interviewees, for example, held that it is difficult to square Kiebackwith the previous Schumacker line
of cases as well as the subsequent CJEU judgment on the football agent.66 Interviewees attributed the inconsistencies
to the (increasing) fact‐oriented approach of the CJEU that could result in a casuistic case law leading to evermore ques-
tions in future cases in which the facts are (slightly) different.
53Interviews 27, 37, 78, 87; M. Loth, ‘Who Has the Last Word? On Judicial Lawmaking in European Private Law’ (2017) 25 European Review of Private Law,
45, 65; P. Oliver and C. Stothers, ‘Intellectual Property under the Charter: Are the Court's Scales Properly Calibrated’ (2017) 54 Common Market Law Review,
517, 565.
54Interview 30.
55Interviews 10, 15, 30, 34, 44, 59, 82.
56Interviews 15, 18, 32, 34, 41, 43, 44, 87, 91.
57Interview 87.
58Interviews 10, 27, 44, 87, 89.
59Interviews 30, 32, 34, 59, 75, 78, 79, 81. The requests of the Supreme Court ‘verge on being inadmissible’. A‐G Jääskinen in joined cases C‐10/14, C‐14/
14 and C‐17/14, Miljoen, ECLI:EU:C:2015:429, para. 40.
60Interviews 10, 18, 91.
61Interviews 27, 30, 41, 45, 87.
62Interviews 33, 78, 87.
63Interviews 45, 87.
64Interviews 27, 87.
65Case C‐81/87, Daily Mail, ECLI:EU:C:1988:456.
66Case C‐9/14, Kieback, ECLI:EU:C:2015:406; Case C‐283/15, X., ECLI:EU:C:2017:102; Interviews 30, 78.
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4.2 | Unclear or no answer from the CJEU
Judges from all highest Dutch courts complained that some CJEU judgments do not contain a clear answer. At other
times, the CJEU answers a question that was not posed or gives no answer at all.67 For all courts, several such cases
could be identified based on the legal analysis and interviews conducted, even though it seems that there are fewer
unclear CJEU judgments for the Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal and the tax chamber.
One type of problematic CJEU judgments is those in which the CJEU does not answer the questions.
An interviewee of the civil chamber pointed to an older case about the registration of the melody of ‘Für
Elise’ as a trade mark. According to this interviewee the CJEU delved into other issues than the question of
the Supreme Court that was disqualified as irrelevant by the CJEU.68
The interviewees of the tax chamber also pointed to an older case, Arens‐Sikken. In this case about
inheritance duties and overendowment debts, the CJEU considered that ‘there is no need to answer’ the
second question about certain CJEU judgments, because it considered the question ‘not relevant in the
present case’.69
Interviewees of the Council of State70 and Central Appeals Tribunal71 also discussed several questions that were
dodged by the CJEU.
In Willems, a case dealing with the collection and storage of biometric data, the CJEU did not delve into
the data protection directive 95/46 even though the Council of State had paid considerable attention to
this directive in its order for reference, albeit not in the eventual questions. The CJEU – rather
formalistically – mentioned that the questions were only related to Regulation 2252/2004 standards
for security features and biometrics in passports and travel documents (‘and only that regulation’).72
Something similar happened with the questions inTrijber andHarmsen about the application of the Services
Directive to purely internal situations, which led to follow‐up questions in a subsequent case (Visser
Vastgoed) in which the Council of State noted explicitly that its earlier questions were not answered.73
As mentioned earlier, an unsatisfactory answer can also stem from the order for reference and the fact that certain
questions or aspects of the case are not formulated explicitly and accurately enough.
One clear example is the reference of the civil chamber in Préservatrice Foncière. The CJEU focused only
on the liability of the State on the basis of a private‐law guarantee contract, while it was also relevant that
the CJEU delved into another aspect (joint and several liability).74
67Interview 30.
68The CJEU did not answer the question on the modes of representation (‘in the absence of relevance’), because Shield Mark did not file an application for
registration in the form of a sonogram, a sound recording, a digital recording or a combination of those methods. Case C‐283/01, Shield Mark, ECLI:EU:
C:2003:641, para. 54.
69Case C‐43/07, Arens‐Sikken, ECLI:EU:C:2008:490, para. 59.
70The CJEU declared the seventh question about services of general economic interest inadmissible and limited itself to the free movement of capital. Case
C‐567/07, Servatius, ECLI:EU:C:2009:593. The ABRvS was also ‘forced’ to ask follow‐up questions in Somvao about the recovery of wrongly paid subsidy
grants because of the insufficient answer in ESF. Case C‐383/06, ESF, ECLI:EU:C:2008:165; Case C‐599/13, Somvao, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2462.
71In Martens, concerning the continued grant of funding for higher education outside that State, the CJEU did not answer the essential first question, which
was also noted by the CRvB. Case C‐359/13, Martens, ECLI:EU:C:2015:118; CRvB 31 July 2015, ECLI:NL:CRVB:2015:2357 (Martens), para. 4.3. The CRvB
also considered follow‐up questions after Akdas concerning the exportability of social security allowances for Turkish migrant workers. Case C‐485/07,
Akdas, ECLI:EU:C:2011:346.
72Joined cases C‐446/12 to C‐449/12, Willems, ECLI:EU:C:2015:238.
73Joined cases C‐340/14 and C‐341/14, Trijber and Harmsen, ECLI:EU:C:2015:641; ABRvS 13 January 2016, ECLI:NL:RVS:2016:75 (Visser Vastgoed), para.
20.1.
74Case C‐266/01, Préservatrice foncière, ECLI:EU:C:2003:282.
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Another problem occurs when the CJEU gives unfeasible directions to the referring court.
Judges at the Central Appeals Tribunal ‘were at a loss’ after van Delft because the CJEU basically
entrusted it to ‘delve into politics’ and to ascertain whether an unjustified difference of treatment
between residents and non‐residents was made when the Health Care Insurance Act was negotiated.75
In order to do so, the Tribunal invited several civil servants from the Ministry of Health who were
involved in the drafting of the law in order to verify whether Art. 21 TFEU was sidelined in ‘backrooms’
during discussions between the Dutch government and insurance companies.76
Tax judges of the Supreme Court mentioned Sopora as difficult to implement. The CJEU determined in
this case that the tax advantage for persons working in the Netherlands and residing at a distance of
more than 150 kilometres from the Dutch border was not in breach of EU law, unless ‘those limits
were set in such a way that that exemption systematically gives rise to a net overcompensation’.77
The Supreme Court in essence had to examine what the effects of the tax advantage were at a
macro level based on empirical data. These data did not exist, because they were simply not
registered. What is more, the question was whether the Supreme Court should even do this since it is
not a court of fact. Fortunately, the analysis of A‐G Niessen provided sufficient guidelines for the
Supreme Court to decide the case.
Judges also considered it problematic when the CJEU does not take their concerns seriously. In doing so, the CJEU
fails to appreciate that the referral decision and the formulation of the order and the questions is based on a careful
deliberation.78
One case is Diageo Brands. Interviewed civil judges noted that they had ‘great difficulties’ with the answer
of the CJEU. Judges referred to this case as ‘startling’ and ‘very serious’ and noted that this judgment led to
a ‘breakdown of two systems’. The Supreme Court asked whether it was forced to recognise the judgment
of a Bulgarian district court that was based on a Bulgarian Supreme Court judgment ‘manifestly misapplied
EU law’, according to the Dutch Supreme Court.79 In its order, the Supreme Court hinted at non‐
recognition, underlining that there are good reasons for refusing the execution of such an erroneous
judgment. The CJEU, nonetheless, disagreed and presented the principle of mutual recognition and
mutual trust in absolute terms. It also pointed to the Commission who had determined that the
Bulgarian court decisions were consistent with EU law.80 Interviewees especially lamented the latter and
the fact that the CJEU easily followed the ‘political manipulation’ of the Commission who had concluded
a ‘political deal’ with Bulgaria after which it had withdrawn its earlier determination of a breach. In joining
the Commission and A‐G Szpunar, the CJEU did not address the concerns of the Supreme Court and its
‘conviction’ that there was a serious breach.81
Another slightly different case is T‐Mobile. One interviewee held that he/she felt offended by the CJEU,
because the CJEU assigned a certain point of view to the Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal, which it
did not have. The Tribunal asked an open question in relation to which it gave different options for
75Case C‐345/09, van Delft, ECLI:EU:C:2010:610.
76CRvB 13 December 2012, ECLI:NL:CRVB:2011:BU7125 (van Delft), para. 4.2.10.
77Case C‐512/13, Sopora, ECLI:EU:C:2015:108, para. 36.
78Interviews 12.
79The Supreme Court based this conclusion on a letter of the Commission in which the Commission held that lower courts cannot follow the Bulgarian
Supreme Court. HR 20 December 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:2062 (Diageo Brands), paras. 5.2.2, 5.3.2; Interviews 27, 87.
80Case C‐681/13, Diageo Brands, ECLI:EU:C:2015:471, paras. 54–55.
81A‐G Szpunar in Case C‐681/13, Diageo Brands, ECLI:EU:C:2015:137, para. 32; Loth, above, n. 53, 65.
402 KROMMENDIJK
possible answers, but the CJEU seemed to suggest that the Tribunal wanted to ‘push through the throat’ a
particular interpretation.82
With respect to the earlier mentioned problem of unclear answers, some judges had the impression that the CJEU
increasingly comes with judgments in which the CJEU only gives general guidelines.83
Some civil chamber judges, for example, noted that a clear yes/no question was asked in Commerz. The
question was whether or not the guarantees provided by the port authority are attributable to the
municipality of Rotterdam when the sole director of the port authority acted on its own and against the
authority's statutes. In its order for reference, the Supreme Court discussed two options: no imputability
because the municipality was not involved in the adoption of the specific guarantee or attributability
because the municipality determines in general the decision‐making process. The CJEU did not choose
either of the two options and left this for the referring court to decide ‘in the light of all the relevant
evidence’. Interviewees, however, noted that the Supreme Court had already identified all circumstances
in its order.
There are also several vague CJEU judgments in highest administrative court cases in the field of migration and
integration.84
One good example is A., B., C. involving the question how courts can assess the credibility of a declared
sexual orientation of an asylum seeker. According to some judges, the CJEU only mentioned what courts
could not do in their assessment.85 One judge even asked whether it was useful to refer in the end,
because of the loss in time and the fact that the CJEU completely left it to the national court to solve
the case on the basis of considerations that the Council of State had already identified and discussed
before referral.
Another example is Martens about the Dutch three‐out‐of‐six‐years rule, which makes the continued
grant of funding for higher education outside that State subject to the rule that the student applying for
such funding has resided in that Member State for a period of at least three out of the six years
preceding his enrolment. The CJEU only made clear that this rule is not consistent with EU law, but did
not provide much clarity as to how and which factors the Central Appeals Tribunal should examine to
find a genuine link with the Netherlands.
The previous analysis seems to put all the blame on the CJEU. Some judges, however, admitted that the deferential
answers of the CJEU also stem from general or unclear question from the referring courts, as was mentioned
previously.86
Instead of these ‘deference judgments’ containing general answers that defer to the national court on the point
of law, judges prefer concrete ‘outcome cases’ which give a very specific answer that leaves no margin for
manoeuvre for the national court.87 This finding contrasts with the argument put forward in the literature that
national courts dislike CJEU ‘interventionist’ judgments usurping their own jurisdiction or limiting their room for
manoeuvre.88 Judges did not consider it problematic when the CJEU issues very specific ‘outcome cases’ which
82Case C‐8/08, T‐Mobile, ECLI:EU:C:2009:343.
83Interviews 43, 48, 66, 81, 89.
84For more discussion, see Krommendijk, above, n. 13, 144–146; case C‐579/13, P. and S., ECLI:EU:C:2015:369, para. 49.
85Joined cases C‐148/13 to C‐150/13, A., B., C., ECLI:EU:C:2014:2406.
86Interview 75.
87T. Tridimas, ‘Constitutional Review of Member State Action: The Virtues and Vices of an Incomplete Jurisdiction’ (2011) 9 International Journal of Consti-
tutional Law, 737; Interviews 41, 48, 87; Loth, above, n. 53, 65–66.
88G. Davies, ‘Abstractness and Concreteness in the Preliminary Reference Procedure: Implications for the Division of Powers and Effective Market Regu-
lation’, in N.N. Shuibne (ed.), Regulating the Internal Market (Edward Elgar, 2006), 232.
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almost solve the case at hand, as long as the CJEU bases itself on the right facts and a correct reading of national
legislation.89 Judges, for example, valued the CJEU's detailed analysis of national law that left little room for the
Council of State in the earlier mentioned K. and A. case about compulsory civic integration.90 Likewise, interviewed
Supreme Court judges did not dislike GS Media in which the CJEU applied its interpretation of ‘communication to
the public’ to the case in the main proceedings and concluded that it ‘appears, subject to the checks to be made by
the referring court’ that the hyperlink to websites with leaked nude photographs constituted such a communica-
tion.91 Tax chamber judges were also content with concrete judgments, that were criticised in the literature for
being too interventionist.92 They considered that such judgments are unavoidable when the interpretation could
only lead to one outcome.93 Some interviewees also held that the advantage of outcome cases is that they limit
the discussion between the parties after the CJEU judgment and might do away with the need to organise another
hearing.94
4.3 | Incorrect reading of facts and national law
It happens, albeit in fewer cases, that the CJEU interprets the national legal framework wrongly.
The CJEU did not answer the third question in the social security case Franzen because it had
misconstrued the Dutch law considering that the Central Appeals Tribunal is obliged to apply the
hardship clause in order to remedy an unacceptable unfairness.95 The CJEU failed to appreciate that
this is not an obligation, but merely a possibility. In addition, it is not for the referring court to apply the
clause, but the administration. Dutch judges were critical about the CJEU judgment and noted that it
was ‘annoying’. They lamented the lack of communication and the fact that the answer of the CJEU
shows that the CJEU fails to appreciate the importance of the question at stake. Judges wondered
whether there is an understanding of the Dutch social security system, also because this was the second
time that the CJEU made a mistake in relation to the hardship clause.96 One interviewee did not want
to play a blame game but noted that the answers of CJEU caused problems and did not make it
possible for the Supreme Court to decide the case. The tax chamber consequently decided to refer
follow‐up questions. One could debate whether only the CJEU is to be blamed, because the Central
Appeals Tribunal had also provided minimal information on Dutch law. One Dutch judge recognised this
as well and noted that they will pay extra attention to the formulation of the questions and the order
for reference in future references.
The latter option of re‐referral was also discussed recently in two joined cases on corporation tax and a
single tax entity after a CJEU judgment based on a misunderstanding of Dutch tax law.97 A‐G Wattel
noted that the Supreme Court could also be blamed for these ‘blunders’ since it did not ask the correct
questions. He, nonetheless, advised against re‐referral because the case could be solved based on CJEU
89Interviews 33, 59, 69, 77, 82, 87; Only one highest administrative court judge disliked the very detailed judgment in case C‐137/09, Josemans, ECLI: EU:
C:2010:774.
90Case C‐153/14, K. and A., ECLI:EU:C:2015:453.
91Case C‐160/15, GS Media, ECLI:EU:C:2016:644, para. 54; Interviews 27, 45, 87.
92Case C‐59/16, The Shirtmakers, ECLI:EU:C:2017:362; Van Casteren in BNB 2017/147; Case C‐520/14, Gemeente Borsele, ECLI:EU:C:2016:334; V‐N
2016/27.20.
93Interview 15. An interviewee (34) also noted that it is difficult to judge without examining the facts.
94Interviews 69, 77.
95Case C‐382/13, Franzen, ECLI:EU:C:2015:261, paras. 67 and 56; CRvB 1 July 2013, ECLI:NL:CRVB:2013:783 (Franzen), paras. 4.18 and 10.8.
96See earlier C‐287/05, Hendrix, ECLI:EU:C:2007:494.
97Joined cases C‐398/16 and C‐399/16, X., ECLI:EU:C:2018:110, paras. 14–17.
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case law.98 Because the resolution of the cases was pending at the time of the interviews, judges were
reluctant to speak about the joined cases, only noting that the issue at stake is wildly complicated.
In Van der Ham, the CJEU based itself on a different time period as a result of which the CJEU gave an
interpretation of another Regulation than the Regulation about which the Council of State had asked
questions. This mistake was not problematic, because the specific provision in the regulation was the
same.99
A related problem arises when the CJEU bases itself on the wrong facts. This is particularly difficult for a cassation
court like the Supreme Court for whom the facts are established. Several interviewees noted that the CJEU should
keep away from such factual determinations, also because it complicates subsequent decision making.100
One older case of the civil chamber is Ten Kate Holding Musselkanaal in which the CJEU relied on the
intervention of the Commission and the Dutch government.101 The Supreme Court mentioned this
problem in its follow‐up judgment and stipulated that Dutch procedural law does not allow it to take
into consideration the facts as determined by the CJEU.102 One interviewee held that he/she was
flabbergasted and noted that this judgment came as a complete surprise.
In Ladbrokes on games of chance via the internet, the Supreme Court had explicitly stated in its order for
reference that it was established in cassation that the betting activities are limited in a consistent and
systematic manner.103 The CJEU, however, examined whether this indeed was the case and eventually
concluded that it is not, contrary to the Supreme Court.104 This finding resulted, according to one
interviewee, in ‘an enormous struggle’ for the Supreme Court. It eventually ruled that this judgment is
very much interwoven with factual assessments that are only subject to cassation to a limited extent.105
The tax chamber was confronted with a similar problem in one customs case about the tariff classification
of stand‐alone music devices (Sonos). The CJEU itself had consulted the website in order to verify how the
product was presented to consumers.106 Several interviewees noted that the CJEU should not have done
this, because facts are already established for a court of cassation and not subject to review. This
determination did not prove problematic for the Supreme Court to deliver its final judgment.
5 | JUDGES' MOTIVES (NOT) TO REFER
One could imagine that when judges are not always satisfied with the requested CJEU judgments, this could discour-
age them from referring future cases. Surprisingly, the dissatisfaction does not seem to affect the courts' willingness
to refer. The Dutch highest court remain loyal allies of the CJEU. Judges hardly consider their previous experiences
when making the calculation of referral. Allegations of a decreasing willingness were refuted.107 Civil judges, for
example, mentioned that there might initially be a temptation not to refer, especially in the field of intellectual
98ECLI:NL:PHR:2018:624, para. 1.9; ECLI:NL:PHR:2018:687.
99Case C‐396/12, Van der Ham, ECLI:EU:C:2014:98.
100Interviews 15, 27, 30, 41, 48, 59, 82, 87.
101Case C‐511/03, Ten Kate Holding Musselkanaal, ECLI:EU:C:2005:625.
102HR 22 December 2006, ECLI:NL:HR:2006:AZ3083 (Ten Kate Holding Musselkanaal), para. 2.2.2.
103HR 13 June 2008, ECLI:NL:HR:2008:BC8970 (Ladbrokes), para. 4.16.
104Case C‐258/08, Ladbrokes, ECLI:EU:C:2010:308, paras. 21–38.
105HR 24 February 2012, ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BT6689 (Ladbrokes), para. 2.9.4.
106Case C‐84/15, Sonos, ECLI:EU:C:2016:184; see also the subtle reference to the CJEU's intervention in HR 8 July 2016, ECLI:NL:HR:2016:1347 (Sonos),
para. 2.3.
107Interviews 27, 30, 48, 87.
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property, but they argued that the Supreme Court tries to ‘ignore this annoyance’.108 This attitude also explains why
the highest courts have been reluctant to ask follow‐up questions because of a CJEU judgment.109 This has only hap-
pened in a limited number of instances, discussed above.110
This raises the question as to how it can be explained that the Dutch highest courts continue to refer cases to
CJEU. Obviously, in the majority of cases a CJEU answer is considered necessary simply because there is uncer-
tainty regarding the meaning of a particular provision, for example, because it is used in contradictory ways in
EU rules or has not been interpreted by the CJEU before. This article, nonetheless, shows that this logic does
not fully capture the referral practice while also concealing interesting differences between the Dutch highest
courts and additional considerations that play a role. It will be shown that the decision to refer of the Supreme
Court is informed by legalist considerations (Section 5.1), while highest administrative courts are more pragmatic
and practical (Section 5.2). Especially the highest administrative courts also refer sometimes to obtain the CJEU's
authority (Section 5.3).
5.1 | Legalist considerations: The supreme court as a loyal contributor to the
development of EU law
Most Supreme Court judged mentioned legal‐formalist considerations, relating to their obligation to refer under Arti-
cle 267 TFEU as the primary reason behind their decision (not) to refer.111 This shows that the Supreme Court feels
responsible for the correct application of EU law.112 Interviewed A‐Gs and external observers confirmed this loyal
and ‘integer’ approach of the Supreme Court.113 As will be outlined in the next section, only a few highest adminis-
trative court judges mentioned the formalist reason that a case is referred with the idea of complying with the obli-
gation to refer and rather pointed to a ‘natural reluctance’ to refer.
Closely related to the loyalty of the Supreme Court is the wish to contribute to the development of EU law. Sev-
eral Supreme Court judges mentioned this as a general consideration behind the decision to refer. Supreme Court
judges emphasised that it has the task of contributing to the development of EU law.114 One Supreme Court judge,
for example, noted that ‘You are not here for yourself, but also for the rest of Europe’.115 He/she mentioned that the
idea is widely shared in the Supreme Court that it is important that EU law reaches its full potential. According to
him/her, the delay of 1.5 years when referring should be taken for granted and is ‘the price that is paid’ for being part
of the EU system.116 Another interviewee referred to the ‘sense of responsibility’ and the role of the Supreme Court
as a ‘wheel in the gear chain’ of the European legal order, while another stressed the importance of the uniformity of
EU law and the need to avoid divergences (‘one of the most severe sins’).117 A few highest administrative court
judges also made similar remarks about the need to contribute to the development of EU law, but noted at the same
time that the primary purpose of the procedure is to solve a dispute.118 As will be outlined in Section 5.2, most judges
108Interview 27.
109Interviews 27, 30, 33, 45.
110Visser Vastgoed, above, n. 73 and Somvao, above, n. 70.
111Interviews 41, 48, 59, 75, 87.
112J.H.H. Weiler, ‘A Quiet Revolution: The European Court of Justice and its Interlocutors’ (1994) 26 Comparative Political Studies, 510, 520; K.J Alter, Estab-
lishing the Supremacy of European Law: The Making of an International Rule of Law in Europe (Oxford University Press, 2001), 230.
113Interviews 45, 48; E.g. H.P.A.M. van Arendonk, ‘De Hoge Raad als EU‐rechter’ [The Supreme Court as EU‐judge] (2015) Maandblad Belasting
Beschouwingen, 185, 189.




118Interviews 10, 12, 39.
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of the highest administrative courts prefer to prevent a reference and to solve cases themselves, because of the sub-
sequent delay of a referral that could have negative consequences for the parties or other similar cases that might
have to be put on hold.119
Interviewees of the Supreme Court stated that an additional consideration in the decision to refer Diageo
Brands about the execution of Bulgarian judgment (allegedly) in breach of EU law was to raise awareness
in Luxembourg for problems with the independence of the judiciary in some EU Member States. The idea
was that the reference could contribute to the rule of law in the EU.
A clear expression of the ‘natural loyalty’ and the legal formalism of the Supreme Court is the strict application of the
Cilfit exceptions by this court.120 Supreme Court interviewees did not agree with the proposition that Cilfit could be
applied in a lenient manner, as proposed by some highest administrative court judges.121 One Supreme Court
interviewee mentioned: ‘You should not think too quickly that we can decide ourselves with five sensible persons’.122
Another judge proposed a strict application and mentioned, in line with Cilfit, that the Supreme Court should be
‘convinced’ that there is no doubt about the interpretation of EU law. He/she rejected the logic of some highest
administrative court judges that no reference is needed when the question is 80% clair and argued that the Cilfit
criterion is not whether a court is able to come up with a solution itself.123 The Supreme Court hence prefers to play
it safe.124 The tax chamber is even more faithful to Cilfit than the civil chamber and is even criticised for referring too
easily. One lower court tax judge, for example, mentioned that the CJEU has sent the tax chamber an implicit mes-
sage ‘Are you there already again?’ with its judgments handed by a three judge formation without A‐G Opinion.125
Article 20 of the Statute of the CJEU stipulates that the latter happens when ‘the case raises no new point of law’.
The (too) cautious Cilfit approach of the tax chamber is corroborated by data in the way in which the CJEU handled
references from the highest Dutch courts (Table 2). Considerably more requests of the tax chamber (36%) were han-
dled by the CJEU without consulting an A‐G, compared with the highest administrative courts (6–11%) and the civil
chamber (18%).
119Interviews 5, 10, 24, 44, 66, 77, 89.
120The more loyal approach of the Supreme Court does, however, not mean that there are no cases at all which were not referred to the CJEU, but should
have been. One example relates to litigation cost order in IP cases. C.J.S. Vrendenbarg, Proceskostenveroordeling en toegang tot de rechter in IE‐zaken [Liti-
gation costs orders and access to the courts in IP cases] (Kluwer, 2018), 222.
121Interviews 15, 34, 41, 48, 78.
122Interview 27.
123Interview 82.
124van Arendonk, above, n. 113, 189.
125This has, for example, been noted by the lower tax court judges in relation to Case C‐84/15, Sonos, ECLI:EU:C:2016:184 and Case C‐97/15, Sprengen,
ECLI:EU:C:2016:556. Interviews 35, 65.
TABLE 2 Overview of the way in which references (in 2013–2016) were handled by the CJEU
CJEU judgments with A‐G opinion
n %
Council of State 16 94%
Central appeals tribunal 11 91%
Trade and industry appeals tribunal 9 89%
SC tax chamber 36 64%
SC civil chamber 11 82%
aOnly actual CJEU judgments and not the withdrawn cases are counted.
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A possible explanation as to why the tax chamber adheres to Cilfit so strictly is to prevent lower courts from being
tempted to refer. Roughly two‐thirds of all Dutch references come from the highest courts, whereas this has tradi-
tionally been the opposite for the majority of Member States where lower courts have been more active.126 The
explanation of preventing lower courts' referrals coincides with recent studies showing that the highest courts have
‘reconquered’ control from the lowest courts over the application of EU law and references to the CJEU.127 The cau-
tiousness of the tax chamber can be attributed specifically to the famous Van der Steen incident. The Supreme Court
failed to refer the question as to whether a natural person carrying out all work in the name and on behalf of a com-
pany is himself a taxable person within the meaning of the Sixth Directive. The Amsterdam Court of Appeal subse-
quently referred this question to the CJEU.128 In addition, the tax chamber is watched more closely by legal practice
and academia than the highest administrative courts. It is not uncommon to find five commentaries in relation to all
the steps in the reference procedure: the opinion of the A‐G in the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court judgment in
which a referral is made (or not), the opinion of the A‐G in the CJEU, the CJEU judgment, an additional opinion of the
A‐G at the Supreme Court and the eventual judgment of the Supreme Court. By contrast, only a handful of
judgments of the Dutch highest administrative courts are commented upon, while some judgments of the Council
of State are not even published. The tax chamber is thus under more external pressure than the highest administra-
tive courts.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court primarily adopts a legalist framework and primarily refers for legal‐substantive
reasons. The Supreme Court considers it important to contribute to the development of EU law and it adopts Cilfit
strictly. This loyal attitude explains why the Supreme Court continues to refer, despite the earlier mentioned discon-
tent with some CJEU judgments.
5.2 | Pragmatic and practical considerations: The highest administrative courts' natural
reluctance to refer
By contrast, there is a natural reluctance to refer among highest administrative court judges.129 This reluctance does
not relate to the quality of CJEU judgments, but can be attributed to an idea that strict compliance with Article 267
TFEU would result in weekly references, especially in Europeanised fields such as migration.130 The highest admin-
istrative court judges' first instinct is to solve a dispute and decide themselves. They held that it is not necessary
to immediately refer when there is some doubt about the interpretation of EU law.131 Several highest administrative
court judges, for example, held that when the question is 75–80% clair, there is no need to refer.132 Some judges thus
proposed a ‘lighter test’ than Cilfit.133 Interestingly, the Council of State has used the aforementioned CJEU judgment
in Van Dijk, in which the CJEU seemed to loosen the Cilfit requirements, as an additional justification for non‐referral
in several migration cases.134 Some highest administrative court judges even acknowledged that they (implicitly)
126Lower courts made two tax law references in 2013–2016 and seven references in the field of customs. Six of these seven questions dealt with the valid-
ity of EU law which gives rise to an obligation to refer, even for lower courts. See Case 314/85, Foto‐Frost, ECLI:EU:C:1987:452. For a discussion of the
reasons for lower courts (not) to refer on the basis of interviews with 22 judges and legal assistants, see J. Krommendijk, ‘De lagere rechter aan banden.
Is er nog ruimte voor de lagere rechter om te verwijzen naar het HvJ?’ [The lower court judge restricted. Is there still room for the lower court judge to refer
to the CJEU?] (2018) SEW: Tijdschrift voor Europees en economisch recht, 183; see also Krommendijk, above, n. 13, 127–129.
127A. Dyevre, A. Atanasova and M. Glavina, ‘Who Asks Most? Institutional Incentives and Referral Activity in European Union Legal Order’ (2017), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3051659; D.R. Kelemen and T. Pavone, ‘The European Court of Justice's Evolving Relationship with National
Judiciaries’ (2017), unpublished.
128Case C‐355/06, Van der Steen, ECLI:EU:C:2007:615.
129Interview 59; Sevenster and Wissels, above, n. 10, 90.
130Interviews 31, 32, 66, 69, 89; Sevenster and Wissels, above, n. 10, 90.
131Interviews 5, 10, 18, 44, 66, 72, 77, 81, 89.
132Interview 44.
133Council of State judges referred to the test whether the matter is ‘sufficiently, albeit not entirely but to a considerable extent, clair or éclairé’. Interview
72. Sevenster and Wissels, above, n. 10, 91. See also Koelewijn, above, n. 33; E.g. CBb 22 May 2017, ECLI:NL:CBB:2017:179, para. 4.7.
134Sevenster and Wissels, above, n. 10, 87–89. E.g. ABRvS 13 May 2016, NL:RVS:2016:1624, 1383 and 1384.
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apply the less strict Köbler ‘test’ in order to avoid that a non‐referral gives rise to state liability ‘in the exceptional case
where the court has manifestly infringed the applicable law’.135 The highest administrative courts tend to examine
whether the case can be solved on other grounds, preferably national grounds, before delving into the intricacies
of EU law and examining whether the Cilfit exceptions are fulfilled or not.136 By contrast, the Supreme Court studies
all EU law aspects before asking the question whether a reference is indeed necessary.137 One interviewee added
that even when a case can be solved on other grounds, the Supreme Court still examines whether that is also desir-
able.138 The divergence between the Supreme Court and highest administrative courts in the adherence to Cilfit can
also be attributed to the judicial law‐making function of the Supreme Court as a third instance court. The highest
administrative courts are also courts of fact and often rule as second instance courts.139
The reasonable reading of Cilfit also leaves more room for pragmatic and practical considerations.140 This includes,
for example, case‐specific reasons that relate to the importance of the questions concerned or efficiency reasons
concerning the consequences of referring in terms of the delay. The importance of the issue at stake plays an impor-
tant role for highest administrative court judges. The decision (not) to refer was presented by highest administrative
court judges as a balancing of competing considerations: the importance of the question versus the consequences of
the delay in terms of cases to be put on hold.141 Issues of minor importance are more easily decided upon by highest
administrative courts without a referral. The same could also happen when too many cases are affected by a referral.
In such a case, highest administrative court judges do not find it desirable that many cases are put on hold for an
uncertain period.142 This is especially a consideration in the field of migration where there are often many, possibly
hundreds of cases, in which the same question is relevant.143 Interviewed highest administrative court judges
acknowledged that justice would come to a standstill if every question of EU law about which there is doubt were
immediately referred to the CJEU.144 The current President of the Aliens Chamber of the Council of State likewise
held that a responsible judge takes into consideration the consequences of such a delay.145
The delay explains why the Council of State did not refer questions about the intensity of review of the
credibility assessment of the asylum claim in relation to Article 46(3) of the Asylum Procedures
Directive, even though it held that the matter was far from clair.146 It decided the case itself, because a
referral would mean that the Council of State ‘could almost shut down’ because a very large number of
cases had to be put on hold. Nonetheless, when the stakes are high, this could also be (an additional)
reason to refer for courts.
Interestingly, the civil chamber takes pragmatic and practical considerations into account in summary proceedings in
which it is not obliged to refer.147 The urgent character of summary proceedings does in principle not allow for a pre-
liminary reference, even though most proceedings are no longer urgent once they reach the Supreme Court.148
135Interviews 10, 18; Case C‐224/01, Köbler, ECLI:EU:C:2003:513, para. 53. Note that some A‐Gs of the civil chamber also rely on this test in some opin-
ions. E.g. ECLI:NL:PHR:2015:729 (Stichting Brein), para. 2.1.34.




140Jaremba, above, n. 2; Krommendijk, above, n. 13, 133–136.
141Interviews 44, 72, 89.
142Interviews 14, 18, 39, 83. Sevenster and Wissels, above, n. 10, 90.
143Interview 14. See also ABRvS 14 July 2011, NL:RVS:2011:BR3771, para. 2.8.4. Sevenster and Wissels, above, n. 10, 92.
144Interviews 10, 18.
145N. Verheij, ‘Voorwoord’ [Foreword], in Bosma et al., above, n. 10, 83.
146ABRvS 13 April 2016, NL:RVS:2016:890–891, para. 5.2.
147Joined cases 35/82 and 36/82, Morson, ECLI:EU:C:1982:368, paras. 8 and 9.
148Interviews 27, 48, 59, 87.
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Interviewees, nonetheless, considered that there should be ‘something special’ with the case.149 The civil chamber
feels more compelled to refer when the case deals with a question in which there is hardly any CJEU jurisprudence
or when few cases reach the Supreme Court in the main procedure.150 One example where the latter happens fre-
quently is procurement law. The referral in Connexxion was based on the idea that ‘we have to grab the chance’, oth-
erwise such cases would hardly come before the CJEU.151 By contrast, when the importance of the question is of
limited practical relevance, the civil chamber is less eager to refer and ‘dares’ to decide itself.152 The civil chamber
also pays more attention to the wish of the parties in summary proceedings. An additional reason for the referral
of Synthon was that both parties urged the Supreme Court to refer.153
Overall, when courts (feel that they) have discretion (such as the highest administrative courts and the civil cham-
ber in summary proceedings), they use pragmatic and practical considerations to make a decision which cases to refer
or not. Such considerations act as some sort of filtering mechanism preventing those courts from referring on a
weekly basis.
5.3 | The CJEU as a useful ally
Another explanation for the continued willingness of national courts to engage with the CJEU is that the CJEU can
provide support to the national court. Especially in cases with considerable financial or political consequences, a
referral can be helpful for the national court (Section 5.3.1). The authority of the CJEU can also be valuable for
national courts internally vis‐à‐vis the legislature, executive or other branches of the judiciary (Section 5.3.2). The
CJEU's authority can have the same function in a transnational context (Section 5.3.3).
5.3.1 | Assistance from the CJEU in ‘big’ cases out of precaution
Judges held that they are more cautious when the political and financial stakes are higher. Such consequences can
offer an additional ‘push’ to refer.154
The Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal referred a case about the imposition of fine for market
manipulation despite the idea among judges that the issue was clair, which was subsequently illustrated
by the short CJEU judgment and the absence of an A‐G Opinion. The Tribunal considered it a delicate
matter from the perspective of legal certainty and was, therefore, extra cautious.155
During interviews, judges and A‐Gs were asked about Massar. This case dealt with the question whether
the term ‘inquiry’ in the Directive on legal expenses insurance includes a procedure before the Employee
Insurance Agency, in which the employer requests authorisation to dismiss an employee. The reason for
questioning interviewees about this case is that the case at first sight seems rather simple from a legal
point of view in the light of the jurisprudence of the CJEU. This is also because the CJEU handled the
case in a three‐judge formation without A‐G opinion. The Supreme Court judgment explicitly referred to
the considerable financial consequences of a positive answer to the question, also suggesting that other
considerations played a role than purely legal ones.156 One interviewee ‘admitted’ that the Supreme
Court already knew the answer, namely that the costs are covered, and asked the CJEU to ‘tick the
149Interviews 45, 59.
150Interviews 41, 59, 75, 87.
151HR 27 March 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:757 (Connexxion, C‐171/15); Interviews 27, 48, 59, 87.
152Interviews 27, 75. HR 18 May 2018, ECLI:NL:HR:2018:721 (Becton/Braun), para. 3.3.7.
153HR 18 November 2016, ECLI:NL:HR:2016:2643 (Synthon, C‐644/16); Interviews 27, 75, 87.
154Interview 87.
155CBb 6 November 2011, ECLI:NL:CBB:2009:BK2641; Case C‐445/09, IMC Securities BV, ECLI:EU:C:2011:459.
156HR 3 October 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:2901 (Massar), para. 3.7.4.
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box’. Other interviewees held that it was better to have the CJEU decide on the matter and ‘take the
consequences for its account’, because the idea was that the insurance policy costs would rise because
of a positive answer. One interviewee referred to ‘an alibi’. One interviewee argued that given the
financial consequences, the Supreme Court does not easily ‘tap away’ a decision with the risk of making
the wrong choice that has implications for thousands of cases. Preliminary questions were thus wise in
order to ‘to make a potential time bomb harmless in advance’. There were, however, other interviewees
that disagreed with this reading of Massar and simply held that there were doubts about the
interpretation of EU law and noted that it was a disputed matter in relation to which one could
reasonably differ.
Antroposana dealt with the question whether anthroposophical medicinal products could be marketed
without authorisation (CJEU: no). According to the A‐G in the Dutch Supreme Court, the answer to the
question was clair.157 An interviewee likewise argued that the Supreme Court primarily referred in the
light of the consequences for pharmaceutical companies.
In ACI Adam, the CJEU was essentially asked whether the Dutch Law on Copyright was consistent with
EU law (CJEU: no). This law did not distinguish between lawful and unlawful sources from which
consumers download for private use. Again, the considerable implications in this case reinforced the
Supreme Court's inclination to refer.158
5.3.2 | Sword and leapfrog references: reliance on the CJEU's authority internally
The literature, especially earlier social science inspired studies, has primarily emphasised the internal function and
relied on politico‐strategic reasons for referral. Two approaches stand out. First, the bureaucratic politics model, sug-
gesting that courts refer to solve struggles with other, often higher, courts and, hence, ‘leapfrog’ the national judicial
hierarchy in order to seek support for their interpretation from the CJEU.159 Second, the judicial empowerment the-
sis postulating that courts use the referral procedure as a ‘sword’ to force the legislature to amend legislation when
they consider the law to breach EU law.160 This research did not find much support for either thesis. These consid-
erations only played a role in a number of highest administrative courts' cases.161
The ‘leapfrog’ thesis primarily explains referral of lower courts challenging a highest court. Nonetheless, one case
was found in which the Central AppealsTribunal challenged its administrative counterpart, the Council of State, albeit
in a rather indirect way.
In Chavez Vilchez, the Central Appeals Tribunal questioned the minimalist interpretation of Zambrano
included in the Aliens Circular containing the policy rules as applied by the Immigration and
Naturalisation Service.162 The Circular only gave mothers a right of residence, derived from the right of
residence of their children, when the father is not in a position to care for the child.163
157HR 27 January 2006, ECLI:NL:HR:2006:AU5271 (Antroposana, C‐84/06); ECLI:NL:PHR:2006:AU5271, para. 5.
158HR 21 September 2012, ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BW5879 (ACI Adam, C‐435/12).
159K.J. Alter, ‘Explaining National Court Acceptance of European Court Jurisprudence: A Critical Evaluation of Theories of Legal Integration’, in A‐M. Slaugh-
ter, A.S. Sweet and J.H.H. Weiler (eds.), The European Courts and National Courts (Hart, 1998) 225, 241–247.
160An opposite thesis is that national courts ‘shield’ national legislation from the CJEU by withholding references. No support for this thesis was found in
relation to the Dutch highest courts. Weiler, above, n. 112, 523; J. Golub, ‘The Politics of Judicial Discretion: Rethinking the Interaction between National
Courts and the European Court of Justice’ (1996) 19 West European Politics, 360, 377–379; Davies, above, n. 88, 210.
161Interviews 10, 18, 44, 66.
162The CRvB challenged this policy rule, but did not mention the case law of the ABRvS upon which this restrictive reading was based. CRvB 16 March
2015, NL:CRVB:2015:665, para. 4.2; Case C‐133/15, Chavez‐Vilchez, ECLI:EU:C:2017:354; Case C‐34/09, Zambrano, ECLI:EU:C:2011:124.
163ABRvS 9 August 2013, NL:RVS:2013:2837.
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Some highest administrative court judges, albeit certainly not all, underscored the relevance of the ‘sword’ thesis and
acknowledged that the CJEU is sometimes used by national courts to say what they already know with respect to an
issue that is actually clair.164
One example is Wagenborg about ferry services to the Dutch Wadden Sea islands. During the
proceedings, the Minister of Infrastructure took a firm position and according to some interviewees, ‘put
up a smokescreen with a lot of fanfare’ in order to legitimise the awarded concession. The Trade and
Industry Appeals Tribunal was quite confident about the interpretation of EU law, but some judges
considered a ‘helping hand’ from the CJEU useful given the position of the Minister.165
Similar considerations played a role in two references of the Council of State in the area of migration,
Chakroun and K. that are discussed more extensively in another publication.166
Another strategic non‐migration case of the Council of State is Betfair, dealing with a British company
that could not offer its services for betting on sporting events and horse races via internet and
telephone because of the closed licensing system of games of chance.167 Just like the other cases, the
Council of State had doubts about the compatibility of this system with EU law, also because the
Commission had started an infringement procedure against the Netherlands. During the hearing, Betfair
read from Commission documents. One consideration of the Council of State was that it would be put
in a difficult position had it not referred and the Netherlands was subsequently found to breach EU law
in the infringement procedure before the CJEU.
A reference to the CJEU can not only constitute an argument of authority towards the legislature, but also vis‐à‐vis
the executive.
This idea figured in Fischer‐Lintjens.168 The Central Appeals Tribunal felt forced to refer, because the
Dutch organisation that implements national insurance schemes (Svb) was not willing to arrive at a
reasonable solution. Rather, it ‘rigidly’ adhered to the retroactive withdrawal of the certificate of non‐
insurance as a result of which the health care insurance of Fischer‐Lintjens was cancelled. In its order
for reference, the Tribunal hinted at the undesirability of this approach from the perspective of the
principle of legal certainty. One interviewed judge admitted that the Tribunal ‘used’ the CJEU to say
what it wanted to say itself, but with more authority.
One could be critical about a strategic reading of several of these referrals. The decisions to refer in these cases can
equally be explained from a purely legal perspective, as some judges did. Judges argued that when there is much sub-
stantive ‘counteraction’ from the executive or the legislature, this simply shows that there can be doubt about the
interpretation of EU law and there is no acte clair.169
As mentioned earlier, these politic‐strategic reasons do not fully capture the referral practice of the Supreme
Court. Interviewees from the Supreme Court were adamant that the aforementioned politico‐strategic reasons do
not (partly) explain some decisions (not) to refer. They, and some highest administrative court judges,170 emphasised
164Interviews 10, 12, 18.
165CBb 15 April 2013, ECLI:NL:CBB:2013:BZ6922, para. 5.2.
166Chakroun dealt with a Dutch rule, eventually found to breach EU law, that stipulated that family reunification could be refused to a sponsor who does not
have a lasting income which is equal to at least 120% of the minimum wage. Case C‐578/08, Chakroun, ECLI:EU:C:2010:117. The rule in K. and A. required
the family members of a third country national to pass a civic integration exam to enter the Netherlands. Case C‐153/14, K. and A., ECLI:EU:C:2015:453.
Krommendijk, above, n. 13, 122–123.
167Case C‐203/08, Betfair, ECLI:EU:C:2010:307.
168Case C‐543/13, Fischer‐Lintjens, ECLI:EU:C:2015:359.
169Interviews 49, 51.
170Interviews 5, 32, 72, 89.
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that the Supreme Court does not have ‘a strategy’, ‘hidden agendas’ or ‘own interests’ since it is a neutral organ that is
‘too serious’ for that.171 Interviewees also held that the Supreme Court does not need the support of the CJEU vis‐à‐
vis the legislator to strike down national legislation, because it is ‘man enough’ to do so on its own given the consti-
tutional setup and the independence of the judiciary.172 The idea is also that the Supreme Court persuades based on
its judgments.173 Two explanations for the absence of politico‐strategic consideration among Supreme Court judges
were mentioned during interviews.174 Firstly, some interviewees argued that the highest administrative court judges
generally ‘think’ more in political terms and are more focused on the legislature and executive.175 Secondly, it seems
safe to say that politico‐strategic reasons play a more important role in sensitive administrative law fields, such as
migration. Emotions and moral or ethical considerations often play a bigger role in these fields than in an area such
as tax law. Interviewees noted that tax cases are rather technical and ‘only’ deal with money. Such cases hardly ever
relate to the essence of the rule of law and emotions or conscience issues hardly play a role.176 One former asylum
judge who made a move to tax law observed that the confrontational relationship between different levels in the
judicial hierarchy and between the judiciary and the legislature is typical for asylum law.177
5.3.3 | Reliance on the CJEU's authority transnationally
The CJEU's authority is not only sought in internal ‘conflicts’ with the legislature, executive or other courts. It is also
used at times to solve a transnational conflict with other courts or to prevent those conflicts from arising, also with a
view to ensuring the uniformity of EU law. This motive is most visible in the references of the tax chamber in customs
cases. The question in these cases is frequently under which tariff heading of the Combined Nomenclature a partic-
ular good is to be classified. Such a reference does not mean that the Supreme Court does not ‘dare’ to decide the
case itself, as one judge put it.178 The problem is that when the Supreme Court answers the question itself and clas-
sifies the product, it could do so in a different way than courts in other EU Member States. When it chooses a more
disadvantageous classification for the undertaking(s) concerned, this could have the consequence of disrupting trade
flows and distorting competition.179 The Supreme Court is thus more careful in customs cases and prefers referring
to Luxembourg so that ‘the whole of Europe knows where we stand’, thereby guaranteeing the uniform application of
EU law.180 Interviewees realised that the law‐making character is limited in most of these cases and that they do not
pertain to fundamental aspects of the EU legal order.181 This explains, in their view, why most of these references are
handled by the CJEU without A‐G Opinion, as was concluded earlier.182
The Central Appeals Tribunal also used the preliminary ruling procedure to solve a difference in opinion with a
German court in Mertens.183
171Interviews 33, 41, 59, 75, 82.
172Interviews 15, 30, 41, 59, 75; Feteris, above, n. 37, 166.
173Interviews 87.
174One could argue that the difference between politico‐strategic ‘sword’ referrals of the highest administrative courts and the civil chamber's references
out of precaution (discussed in section 5.3.1) is small. One could argue that these cases are comparable. Nonetheless, the interviewed judges talked about
these cases differently. Highest administrative court judges opted for a strategic reading; Supreme Court judges primarily relied on legal‐substantive
arguments.
175Interviews 41, 43, 59, 66.
176Interviews 15, 78, 82.
177Interview 51.
178Interview 30.
179Interviews 15, 33, 78, 82.
180Interview 78.
181Interviews 15, 30, 33.
182Interviews 15, 30, 33.
183Case C‐655/13, Mertens, ECLI:EU:C:2015:62.
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This case dealt with Mertens' right to unemployment benefits who had worked in Germany while living just
across the border in the Netherlands. The Tribunal had tried to contact the German court, where Mertens
had filed his appeal against the German refusal to grant unemployment benefits, with the idea of coming
to a coordinated solution. The German judge, however, declined to do so and was unwilling to discuss
individual pending cases because of privacy considerations.184 According to some interviewees, the case
was rather simple from a legal perspective. The Tribunal also stated in a rather straightforward way in
its order for reference that it was obvious that Germany is obliged to grant the benefits.185 The CJEU
decided accordingly in a three‐judge formation without an A‐G opinion. It only needed 15 paragraphs in
which it referred extensively to its previous case law, thereby suggesting that the matter was clair. The
Central Appeals Tribunal thus received the desired CJEU authority.
6 | CONCLUSION
This article showed that the Dutch highest courts have implemented the requested CJEU judgments almost fully and
automatically. This finding is remarkable because there has been more criticism than ever in recent years with respect
to the preliminary ruling procedure, the CJEU and its case law. The conclusion is also surprising considering that
Dutch courts were not enthusiastic about all CJEU judgments. Interviewed judges of the highest courts pointed to
incoherencies in the case law, factual mistakes or unclear and unanswered questions. This discontent has, however,
not prevented the Dutch courts from referring future cases.
This article thus suggests that there is no (feedback) relationship between the quality of CJEU judgments and the
motives of courts to refer. Several explanations were found for this. The Supreme Court continues to refer cases to
the CJEU because it exhibits a natural loyalty towards its obligation to refer under Article 267 TFEU and tries to
184CRvB 9 December 2013, ECLI:NL:CRVB:2013:2665, para. 3.10.
185Ibid., paras. 3.8–3.9.
TABLE 3 Summary of key findings (the more +, the more that motive/finding applies to the particular court)
Highest administrative






+ (CBb more positive) ++ +++





Motives to refer (Section 5):
Legalist considerations + +++ +++
Strict application of Cilfit + ++ +++
Pragmatic and practical
considerations
+++ ++ (in summary
proceedings)
+
Assistance from CJEU in ‘big’ cases + ++ +
Bureaucratic politics (leapfrog) +
Judicial empowerment (sword) ++
Assistance from CJEU
transnationally
+ + ++ (in custom tariff
cases)
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adhere strictly to Cilfit. While Supreme Court judges primarily include legal‐formalist considerations in their decision
(not) to refer, highest administrative court judges also take practical and pragmatic considerations into account, such
as case‐specific reasons relating to the importance of the question at stake as well as the delay caused by a referral
(see Table 3). This approach was attributed to a natural reluctance to refer which is, however, not connected to the
quality of CJEU judgments. The highest administrative courts' continued engagement with the CJEU was also attrib-
uted to the usefulness of the CJEU as an ally. The CJEU has provided support to national courts when decisions with
considerable financial or political consequences needed to be made. In addition, the help of the CJEU has also been
sought at times vis‐à‐vis the legislature, executive or other branches of the judiciary, as well as other national courts
or administrations in a transnational context. The highest Dutch courts thus remain, for various reasons, loyal inter-
locutors of the CJEU that remain willing to continue sending questions and to implement CJEU judgments fully and
automatically, despite some dissatisfaction.
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